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Abstract: We provide a model of the links between commercialisation and
technological progress, which is consistent with the historical evidence and places
market relations at the heart of the industrial revolution. First, commercialisation
raised wages as a growing reliance on impersonal labour market transactions in place
of customary relations with a high degree of monitoring led to the adoption of
efficiency wages. Second, commercialisation lowered interest rates as a growing
reliance on impersonal capital market transactions in place of active investor
involvement in investment projects led investors to allow borrowers to keep a larger
share of the profits. Third, the resulting rise in the wage/cost of capital ratio led to the
adoption of a more capital-intensive technology. Fourth, this led to a faster rate of
technological progress through greater learning by doing on the capital intensive
production technology. Fifth, the rate of technological progress was raised further by
the patent system, which allowed the commercialisation of property rights in
innovations embodied in machinery.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A long tradition in economic history links the transition to modern economic growth
to the widespread commercialisation of northwest Europe between the late medieval
period and the Industrial Revolution (Toynbee, 1884; Polanyi, 1944; Britnell and
Campbell, 1995). However the precise nature of the links has remained obscure. We
argue in this paper that the growing commercialisation of the late medieval and early
modern periods led to the technological progress of the Industrial Revolution via its
effects on factor prices.
We begin, therefore, with a definition of commercialisation, which we take to
mean more than simply an increase in the proportion of output passing through the
market (Britnell and Campbell, 1995: 1). Commercialisation is seen here as
encompassing also a growing reliance on anonymity in factor markets as labour
markets became more integrated nationally and factor markets more integrated
internationally as well as nationally. Finally, we include also in our definition the
creation of a market in inventions via the patent system.
The link between commercialisation and technological progress thus proceeds
as follows. First, commercialisation raised wages as a growing reliance on impersonal
labour market transactions in place of customary relations with a high degree of
monitoring led to the adoption of efficiency wages. Second, commercialisation
lowered interest rates as a growing reliance on impersonal capital market transactions
in place of active investor involvement in investment projects led investors to allow
borrowers to keep a larger share of the profits. Third, the resulting rise in the
wage/cost of capital ratio led to the adoption of a more capital-intensive technology.
3Fourth, this led to a faster rate of technological progress through greater learning by
doing on the capital intensive production technology. Fifth, the rate of technological
progress was raised further by the patent system, which offered greater protection of
property rights in innovations embodied in machinery.
The approach taken here draws on ideas which have been used in the literature
on the importance of high wages in stimulating the innovations of the Second
Industrial Revolution in late nineteenth century America (Habakkuk, 1962, David,
1975). Until recently, there has been a reluctance to cast Britain in the role of a high
wage producer at the time of the Industrial Revolution, since the vast literature on the
standard of living debate emphasised the slowness of real wages to rise. However,
recent work has emphasised international comparisons of the level of real wages and
other factor prices, pointing clearly to Britain’s exceptional combination of factor
prices (Allen, 2001; 2006; Broadberry and Gupta, 2006; 2008). This is important not
only in explaining the adoption of modern technology, but also its non-adoption in
other countries with different factor prices, a point emphasised in the theoretical
literature by Zeira (1998) and in the historical literature by Broadberry and Gupta
(2008), Allen, (2006) and Fremdling (2000). It should be noted that our approach
provides a more direct link between commercial development and economic growth
than that provided by Acemoglu et al. (2005), who emphasise an interaction between
the growth of Atlantic trade and institutions in the form of constraints on the
executive. Our approach also maps into variables which are more objectively
measurable than institutional quality.
4The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we provide a theoretical model to
establish the links between commercialisation and technological progress. Here, we
build upon the approach of Greif (1994), who established a link between anonymous
market trading relationships and efficiency wages, but without considering explicitly
the implications for technology. In section III, we then examine the historical
evidence on the links between the commercialisation of the late medieval and early
modern period and the technological progress of the Industrial Revolution, focusing
on the “Little Divergence” of productivity and living standards within Europe before
the “Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia.
II. MODELLING THE TRANSITION TO MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH
In this section we provide a simple model which links the technological development
of the industrial revolution period to the prior commercial development of the late
medieval and early modern periods via factor prices. Growing commercialisation
leads to an increase in the wage rate, a decline in the rate of interest and hence an
increase in the wage/rental price of capital ratio. This leads in turn to the adoption of
more capital intensive technology and an acceleration in the rate of technological
progress. The commercialisation of invention through the patent system leads to a
further increase in the rate of technological progress.
1. The basic framework
There are two technologies to produce a consumption good A with fixed factor
proportions, indexed ^ `T,Mi  , where the modern technology M is capital intensive,
while the traditional technology T is labour intensive. Thus, denoting capital by ki and
5labour by li, we assume that kM > kT and lM < lT. With a wage rate w and a rate of
interest r, entrepreneurial profits are given by:
A – li w – ki (1+r)
The user cost of capital is (1+r) in our framework, since the price of capital is
normalised to unity, there are no capital gains and the capital depreciates fully after
production. There are L individuals in the economy, each endowed with a unit of
labour that can be supplied with a utility cost normalised to unity. Shirking workers
do not supply their unit of labour and therefore do not suffer this disutility. Among the
L individuals there are n entrepreneurs who can organise production using one of the
two technologies. For simplicity, we assume that kT = 0, so there is no need to borrow
if the traditional technology is adopted. Finally, we assume that n lT < L so there is
always excess supply of labour.1
2. Production
An entrepreneur willing to produce with the modern technology needs to borrow kM
from a financial sector at interest rate r. Each entrepreneur who uses the M technology
will obtain utility:
UM = A – (lM -1) w – kM r - 1 (1)
while each entrepreneur who uses the T technology will obtain utility:
UT = A – (lT -1) w - 1 (2)
3. The labour market
1 This implies that (Į n lM + (1-Į) n lT) < L, for all Į, where Į is the share of entrepreneurs using the
modern technology
6Once hired, individuals decide whether to supply effort or to shirk. If they are caught
shirking, they will not receive any wages. Since the probability of getting away with
shirking is qL, the wage w has to satisfy the no-shirking constraint, qL w < w -1, or:
Lq
w

t
1
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Condition (3) is a familiar result from the theory of efficiency wages, and appears also
in the work of Greif (1994) as a mechanism for merchants deterring the opportunistic
behaviour of agents. The interesting implication here is that a greater reliance on
anonymous market forces rather than customary relations will lead to an increase in
wage rates. As qLĺ, so w rises. This is because workers need to be paid more than
their reservation wage, so as to deter opportunistic behaviour in the form of shirking.
In a world of personalised labour relations, the employer does not need to pay an
efficiency wage, but rather monitors the performance of the workers directly.
Comparing (3) with (1) and (2) and noticing that lT > lM, we can argue that a
labour market equilibrium exists if A-1> (lT -1)/(1-qL) or
qL < (A- lT) (A-1), (4)
which henceforth we will assume to hold. This is necessary, because if qL is too high,
then the entrepreneur cannot make a profit and no labour market equilibrium will
exist.
4. The capital market
The demand for capital arises from the desire of entrepreneurs to use the modern
technology. Entrepreneurs need capital kM to invest in the modern technology, but at
the same time provide knowledge which is specific to the project. Hence another
individual cannot take over the project once the investment has been made, which
7generates a lock-in effect. Accordingly, on one side of the market, the provider of
capital may threaten the entrepreneur to withdraw the finance, while on the other side
of the market, the entrepreneur can threaten the provider of capital to withdraw his
project specific knowledge, making the investment unprofitable. The interest rate r
has an upper bound since the entrepreneur, exactly like the workers before, may cheat
by defaulting on his loan and running away with the entire profits without paying the
capital owners. Similarly to the earlier case of labour market shirking, qK is the
probability of getting away with this reneging on contractual responsibilities. From
the following no-default condition qK (A – (l – 1) w) < A – kM (1+r) – (l – 1) w, we
obtain:
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As the probability of escaping without penalty rises (qK ĺ ), the interest rate r
declines. The implication here is that placing greater reliance on anonymous market
forces rather than customary relations results in lower interest rates. The reason for
this is that the entrepreneur has to be allowed to keep a greater proportion of the
profits to make opportunistic behaviour less attractive. In a world where the investor
takes an active part in the project, there is less need to rely on such incentive
mechanisms, since the investor can monitor the project more tightly.
5. Choice of technology
8We now characterise equilibrium in the model. It is natural to think that qL and qK are
correlated, so for notational simplicity we assume qL = qK = q. Because of the
assumption of excess supply of labour, the no-shirking constraint is always binding,
so the equilibrium wage is:
q1
1
*w

 (6)
Moreover, we assume that entrepreneurs and capital owners enter into a Nash bargain,
so that in equilibrium:
r*  
(1q) A ( lM 1)w * 
2kM
(7)
Notice that the two equilibria exist only if 1-q>(l-1M)/A, a condition that we will
henceforth assume to be satisfied. Using the modern technology, entrepreneurial
utility in equilibrium can be obtained by substituting for w and r in equation (1):
UM  
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This is inverse u-shaped in Figure 1.
Using the traditional technology, the equilibrium wage is again given by
equation (6), with the no-shirking constraints binding. Entrepreneurial utility in
equilibrium is then obtained by substituting for w and r in equation (2):
1
)q1(
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This is always downward sloping in Figure 1. Comparing the equilibrium utilities, we
can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1: There is a probability of getting away with shirking or defaulting q*,
such that entrepreneurs choose the modern technology iff q> q*
9Note from Figure 1 that the higher is q, the probability of getting away with shirking
or defaulting, the lower the rental cost of capital and the higher the wage. Hence there
will be a switch away from the labour intensive to the capital intensive technology as
q increases.
6. Technological progress
The use of a capital-intensive technology has a positive spillover generated by
learning by doing. More formally, assume that the economy replicates itself once, and
that the technology increases according to the following rule.
A(t+1) = A(t)(1+ i(K(t))F (10)
where K(t)= nM (t) kM and nM (t) is the number of entrepreneurs using the capital
intensive technology at time t, i(.) is the number of innovations and F the value of
each innovation. As more entrepreneurs adopt the capital intensive technology, there
will thus be an acceleration in the rate of technological progress.
We now provide micro-foundations for this process of technological progress,
to illustrate the importance of an efficient system for protecting intellectual property.
We assume that all individuals can have an idea, with probability ȝ, for improving the
technology when working in a capital intensive firm. The process of thinking requires
a fixed cost c in terms of effort. If the innovator can appropriate an amount Ȗ from the
innovation, the expected profit from an innovation is ȖȝȤ– c. Accordingly, there will
only be innovations if Ȗ > c/ȝȤ. If patent protection is sufficiently poor, Ȗ will be too
low to generate technological progress.
III. COMMERCIALISATION AND TECHNOLOGY IN HISTORY, 1300-1850
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1. Patterns of commercialisation
Recent research suggests that northwest Europe, particularly Britain and Holland,
developed very differently from the rest of Europe from the late middle ages.
Although Allen (2001) used the term Great Divergence to describe this process, the
term is more usually reserved for the emerging gap in living standards between
Europe and Asia from the time of the Industrial Revolution (Pomeranz, 2000). To
avoid confusion, we prefer to use the term “Little Divergence” to describe this Anglo-
Dutch development. Since the Industrial Revolution occurred in northwest Europe at
the end of the Little Divergence, a full understanding of the take-off to modern
economic growth requires a study cutting across the conventional time periods of
economic history. This section argues that the key aspects of the Little Divergence all
reflect different aspects of a single process, the growing commercialisation of the
region.
One way in which the growing commercialisation of the economy can be
captured quantitatively is in the share of the population living in urban areas, since
towns were the centres of commerce. Table 1 provides data on the share of the
population living in towns of at least 10,000 inhabitants. For Europe as a whole, the
trend is unmistakeably upwards from 1400. Looking at regional trends, however,
urbanisation displays the Little Divergence pattern. In the late medieval period there
were two main urban centres of commerce in north Italy and in the Low Countries.
While urbanisation stalled in north Italy after 1500, there was a brief surge in Portugal
and to a lesser extent Spain during the sixteenth century, following the opening up of
the new trade routes to Asia and the New World. However, the most dramatic growth
of urbanisation in the early modern period occurred in the Netherlands in the sixteenth
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and seventeenth centuries and in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as those countries displaced the Iberian powers in long distance trade and
commercialised their domestic economies to an unprecedented extent.
The extent of commercialisation and the spread of specialisation which
accompanied it can also be captured in Table 2 in the declining share of the labour
force engaged in agriculture. The link between commercialisation and the share of the
labour force in agriculture is at least implicit in the historical literature on proto-
industrialisation following the work of Mendels (1972), who saw commercialisation
leading to the development of industry in the countryside before the Industrial
Revolution. It is also implicit in the work of Brenner (1982), who emphasises the
contrast between England, where the peasantry was replaced by tenants and labourers
who had to compete in the market, and the continent where peasants were able to
cling to the land and preserve feudal property rights. In 1500, the release of labour
from agriculture had proceeded further in the Netherlands than in the rest of Europe,
as the Dutch economy relied increasingly on imports of basic agricultural products
such as grain and paid for them with exports of higher value added products (de Vries
and van der Woude, 1997). Although Britain remained self-sufficient in grain until the
Industrial Revolution, commercialisation ensured that by the early nineteenth century
the value added per worker in agriculture was no lower than in the rest of the
economy (Deane and Cole, 1967: 65; Crafts, 1985: 61-63). After 1500, the sharpest
decline in the share of the labour force in agriculture occurred in England, so that by
1800 the share of the labour force engaged in agriculture was lower in England than in
the Netherlands. Furthermore, in both countries, agriculture’s share of the labour force
was substantially lower than in the rest of Europe.
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2. Wages
The Little Divergence was first identified from the comparison of levels rather than
simply growth rates of wages in Europe. Although the necessary data have been
available since the pioneering work of the International Scientific Committee on Price
History during the 1930s, the early work using the data on wages and prices tended to
focus on the path of wages in an individual country, or where comparisons were
made, tended to focus on differences in the rate of change rather than differences in
the level (Cole and Crandall, 1964; Braudel and Spooner, 1967; Phelps Brown and
Hopkins, 1981). This really only changed with the work of van Zanden (1999) and
Allen (2001), who made wage comparisons amongst many European countries for the
period after 1500, focusing on levels. Broadberry and Gupta (2006) made wage level
comparisons between Europe and Asia, while Pamuk (2007) has looked at the
European data back to 1300, crossing the period of the Black Death.
Table 3 sets out the pattern of silver wages in Europe. The silver wage is the
silver content of the money wage in the local currency, and is useful for comparing
wages across countries on a silver standard. Note first that Northwestern Europe saw
substantial silver wage growth in the century after the Black Death of the mid-
fourteenth century and again during the early modern period after 1500, as well as
during the Industrial Revolution period from the mid-eighteenth century, when Britain
finally overtook the Netherlands decisively. Second, note that although southern
Europe shared in the rise in the silver wage following the Black Death, from the mid
fifteenth century the region was characterised more by fluctuations than by trend
growth in the silver wage. Third, central and eastern Europe were also characterised
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more by fluctuations than by trend growth in the silver wage from the mid-fourteenth
century. If commercialisation leads to rising wages, this is the pattern that we would
expect, with southern Europe playing an important part in the commercialisation of
the continent during the first half of the millennium, but with northwest Europe
playing the leading role after 1500.
3. Interest rates and the cost of capital
We are interested in the incentives to adopt capital intensive technology. Hence we
need also to examine the cost of capital, an important element of which is the rate of
interest. The path of the risk-free rate of interest in Britain over the period between the
mid-twelfth and mid-nineteenth centuries has been measured by Clark (1988) in two
ways. First, perpetual rent charges were perpetuities which gave the purchaser a
specified payment each year, with the payment secured on buildings or land. The ratio
of the rent to the purchase price can be used to calculate the rate of interest in nominal
terms. Second, an estimate of the rate of interest in real terms can be obtained by
comparing the ratio of land rents to land prices. The real rate of return on holding land
(r) is given by:
P/PÖP/PÖP/Rr LLL  
where R is the nominal land rent, PL is the price of land, P is the general price level
and a hat over a variable indicates the rate of change. Since the real price of land did
not appreciate rapidly over this period, the ratio of the land rent to the price of land
can be taken as an indicator of the real rate of interest.
Since the annual inflation rate was generally low during this period, nominal
and real rates are not very different, as can be seen in Table 4. Both the rent charges
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and the land rent data suggest a rate of interest around 10% in the late medieval
period, falling to 5-6% in the aftermath of the Black Death, 1350-1400. There was a
further reduction in the rate of interest during the first half of the eighteenth century,
to around 3-4%.
The evidence for a number of other European countries is shown in Table 5,
indicating a similar decline in interest rates in all countries for which we have data.
This is consistent with the convergence of interest rates within an integrated capital
market, and can be seen also in Epstein’s (2000: 19) data on interest rates on public
debt and in Neal’s (1990: 141-165) data on stocks that were traded internationally.
This pattern can be attributed to the greater international mobility of capital than
labour. The downward trend of interest rates in Europe, combined with the increase in
wages, translates into an increase in the wage/cost of capital ratio.
4. Factor prices and technology
Although interest rates had converged by the eighteenth century, wages had not,
which means that the wage/cost of capital ratio was higher in northwest Europe than
in the rest of the continent, providing a greater incentive for the substitution of capital
for labour in Britain and Holland. And yet until very recently, there has been
surprisingly little work on the role of factor prices in the adoption of capital intensive
technology before or during the Industrial Revolution. The omission is all the more
surprising given the central role accorded to factor prices in most accounts of Anglo-
American differences in technology and productivity during the nineteenth century
(Rothbarth, 1946; Habakkuk, 1962; David, 1975; Broadberry, 1997).
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Recent work by Broadberry and Gupta (2006; 2008) and by Allen (2006)
emphasises the important role of factor prices in explaining the key technological
choices of the Industrial Revolution period. Broadberry and Gupta (2008) point to the
much higher wages in Britain than in India already in the late seventeenth century,
when Indian cotton textiles were imported into Britain by the East India Company.
This can be seen in the first column of Table 6. Combined with the smaller
differences in the cost of raw cotton and the cost of capital, this presented British
producers with a severe total factor input (TFI) price disadvantage. To get to a point
where the free on board price was cheaper in Britain, required a shift to more capital
intensive technology and a sustained period of technological progress to increase total
factor productivity (TFP). For much of the eighteenth century, the fledgling British
cotton industry required protection, although the point at which the shift in
competitive advantage from India to Britain occurred varied by product (as a result of
different input costs) and by market (as a result of transport costs).
As Allen (2006) notes, another feature of Britain’s unusual factor price
development was the high price of wood and low price of coal, which encouraged a
shift to coal-using technology. In the case of the cotton industry, this became a major
factor only after the period of the major macro inventions, since water power was the
main source of energy before the 1820s. Allen (2006) also sees Britain’s high wages
as important in explaining why the innovations of the Industrial Revolution period
were not immediately applicable to other European economies, where wages were
lower than in Britain.
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Once the shift to capital-intensive technology had occurred, technological
progress accelerated. In Table 6, TFP growth shifted in Britain’s favour at an annual
rate of 0.3 per cent before 1770, rising to 1.5 per cent during the period 1770-1820.
This would be quite consistent with the 1.9 per cent per annum TFP growth rate
estimated by Harley (1993: 200) for the British cotton industry between 1780 and
1860, together with slowly rising or stagnating productivity in India.
One reason for expecting an increase in TFP growth following the shift to
capital intensive technology is the greater potential for learning on capital intensive
technology, as emphasised by Arrow (1962). However, modern Schumpeterian
models of economic growth also emphasise the role of the patent system, which gave
better protection of intellectual property rights to innovations embodies in machinery
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Until very recently, the patent system during the
Industrial Revolution received surprisingly little attention in mainstream economic
history. The modern literature really began with the study of the English patent
system during the Industrial Revolution by Dutton (1984) and Sullivan (1989), who
highlighted the surge in patents from the middle of the eighteenth century, shown here
in Figure 2, and saw it as a causal factor. MacLeod (1988) examined the evolution of
the system from the mid-seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, but
emphasised its shortcomings as much as its advantages. More recently, Broadberry
and Gupta (2008) emphasise the role of the British patent system, or other incentives
to innovate such as prizes, in the acceleration of technological progress in cotton
textiles.
5. The upshot for economic development
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In Table 3, we examined the path of silver wages. However, an analysis of the
transition to modern economic growth would not be complete without considering the
path of real consumption wages and GDP per capita. The real consumption wage is
obtained by dividing the silver wage with the silver price of basic consumption goods.
Real consumption wages of European unskilled building labourers for the period
1300-1850 are shown in Table 7, taking London in the period 1500-49 as the
numeraire. The first point to note is that real wages followed a similar pattern across
the Black Death in the whole of Europe. Complete time series exist for comparatively
few cities before 1500, but there is also scattered evidence for other cities. Taken
together, the evidence supports the idea of a substantial rise in the real wage across
the whole continent of Europe following the Black Death, which struck in the middle
of the fourteenth century, wiping out between a third and a half of the population,
when successive waves of the plague are cumulated (Herlihy, 1997). This episode of
European economic history is thus broadly consistent with the Malthusian model,
with a strong negative relationship between real wages and population. In the first half
of the fifteenth century, the real wage was quite uniform across the countries for
which we have data, at about twice its pre-Black Death level. From the second half of
the fifteenth century, however, Britain and Holland followed a very different path
from the rest of Europe, maintaining real wages at the post-Black Death level and
avoiding the collapse of real wages which occurred on the rest of the continent.
Table 7 on its own appears to paint a pessimistic Malthusian picture of the
early modern period, with stagnation in Britain and Holland and decline in the rest of
the continent. However, it is important to bear in mind that the wage data here are
daily wages, rather than weekly or annual earnings. So although daily real wages
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stagnated in northwestern Europe, annual real earnings and per capita incomes were
increasing as the number of days worked per year increased substantially, in what de
Vries (1994) labels the “Industrious Revolution”. The scale of this effect is quite
large, with the loss of approximately fifty holidays per year following the reformation,
and a further fifty days through the abolition of “St Monday”, the widely accepted
pre-industrial practice of not working at the beginning of the week following the
excesses of the weekend (Voth, 1998).
Hence the real wage evidence of Table 7 should not be taken as indicative of
stagnating real per capita incomes in northwest Europe before the Industrial
Revolution. Table 8, taken from van Zanden (2006), provides estimates of per capita
GDP for seven countries. Although pre-industrial growth was quite substantial in
Britain and the Netherlands, stagnation was the norm in the other countries for which
we have data. The national income data thus reinforce the conclusion from the real
wage data that Britain and Holland followed a different path from the rest of Europe.
But again, it must be stressed that the national income data, based on annual
observations, present a more optimistic view of the pre-industrial world than the real
wage data, based on daily data.
The historical data thus point to the emergence of modern economic growth as
along drawn out affair, reaching back to the rise of real wages in the late medieval
period, following the Black Death, and the subsequent divergent path of relative
factor prices in northwest Europe and the rest of the continent. This divergence in
relative factor prices led to the adoption of a more capital intensive production process
19
in northwest Europe, culminating in the acceleration of techno logical progress in
Britain during the Industrial Revolution.
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have argued that commercialisation played a pivotal role in the transition to
modern economic growth. We see the growing commercialisation of the late medieval
and early modern periods as leading to the acceleration of technological progress
during the Industrial Revolution period via its effects on factor prices. The argument
can be summarised as follows: (1) Commercialisation raised wages as a growing
reliance on impersonal labour market relations in place of customary relations with a
high degree of monitoring led to the adoption of efficiency wages. (2)
Commercialisation lowered interest rates as a growing reliance on impersonal capital
market transactions in place of active investor involvement in investment projects led
investors to allow borrowers to keep a larger share of the profits. (3) The resulting rise
in the wage/cost of capital ratio led to the adoption of a more capital-intensive
production technology. (4) This led to a faster rate of technological progress through
greater learning by doing on the capital intensive technology (5) The rate of
technological progress was also raised by the patent system, which offered greater
protection of property rights in innovations embodied in machinery. The patent
system can itself be seen as another reflection of the spread of commercialisation to
the process of invention.
We have used the term “commercialisation” to describe the process of
evolution of the institutional system, noting that the growing reliance on market forces
proceeded more rapidly in northwest Europe than in the rest of the continent
20
following the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century. We do not have a simple
answer to why the northwestern and southern parts of Europe responded so differently
in terms of commercial development to the shock of the Black Death. However, by
mapping into directly measurable variables such as factor prices, we hold out the
possibility of a more empirical approach to the role of institutions in very long run
growth.
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FIGURE 1: Effects of q on choice of technology
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TABLE 1: European urbanisation rates (%)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870
Scandinavia -- -- 0.7 2.1 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.5
England (Wales) 4.0 2.5 2.3 6.0 13.2 16.4 22.1 43.0
Scotland -- -- 2.3 1.5 5.3 11.5 23.9 36.3
Ireland 0.8 2.1 -- 1.0 5.1 5.1 7.3 14.2
Netherlands -- -- 17.1 29.5 32.5 29.6 28.6 29.1
Belgium 18.2 21.9 17.6 15.1 20.2 16.5 16.6 25.0
France 5.2 4.7 5.0 6.3 8.7 8.7 8.9 18.1
Italy CN 18.0 12.4 16.4 14.4 13.0 13.6 14.2 13.4
Italy SI 9.4 3.3 12.7 18.6 16.1 19.4 21.0 26.4
Spain 12.1 10.2 11.4 14.5 9.6 9.1 14.7 16.4
Portugal 3.6 4.1 4.8 11.4 9.5 7.5 7.8 10.9
Switzerland 3.0 2.0 2.8 2.7 3.3 4.6 3.7 8.2
Austria (Czech, Hung) 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.7 2.6 3.1 7.7
Germany 3.4 3.9 5.0 4.4 5.4 5.7 6.1 17.0
Poland 1.0 1.3 5.4 6.6 3.8 3.4 4.1 7.8
Balkans 5.2 4.6 7.7 13.3 14.0 12.3 9.8 10.6
Russia (European) 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.5 3.6 6.7
EUROPE 5.4 4.3 5.6 7.3 8.2 8.0 8.8 15.0
Source: Paolo Malanima (private communication).
TABLE 2: Share of agriculture in the labour force (%)
England Netherlands Italy France Poland
1300 76.4 -- 63.4 -- --
1400 73.6 -- 60.9 71.4 76.4
1500 72.8 56.8 62.3 73.0 75.3
1600 68.9 48.7 60.4 67.8 67.4
1700 55.0 41.6 58.8 63.2 63.2
1750 45.0 42.1 58.9 61.1 59.3
1800 35.5 40.7 57.8 59.2 56.2
Source: Derived from Allen (2000: 8-9).
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TABLE 3: Daily silverwages of European unskilled building labourers (grams of silver per day)
1300-
49
1350-
99
1400-
49
1450-
99
1500-
49
1550-
99
1600-
49
1650-
99
1700-
49
1750-
99
1800-
49
Northwestern Europe
London 2.9 3.4 4.5 3.8 3.2 4.6 7.1 9.7 10.5 11.5 17.7
Amsterdam 3.1 4.7 7.2 8.5 8.9 9.2 9.2
Antwerp 3.5 3.1 3.0 5.9 7.6 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.7
Paris 2.8 5.5 6.6 6.9 5.1 5.2 9.9
Southern Europe
Valencia 5.6 5.2 4.2 6.6 8.8 6.9 5.7 5.1 --
Madrid -- 6.3 8.0 -- 5.1 5.3 8.0
Florence/Milan 2.2 4.5 3.8 3.5 2.9 3.8 4.7 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.1
Naples 3.3 3.5 5.3 4.8 4.8 3.8 3.8
Central & eastern
Europe
Gdansk 2.1 2.1 3.8 4.3 3.8 3.7 4.8
Warsaw -- 2.5 3.2 2.7 1.9 3.4 4.9
Krakow 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.2 2.9 2.4
Vienna 4.0 3.2 2.7 2.6 4.4 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.1
Leipzig -- 1.9 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.1 4.4
Augsburg 2.1 3.1 4.0 4.7 4.2 4.3 --
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 7); derived from the database underlying Allen (2001: 429).
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TABLE 4: Interest rates in Britain (% per annum)
Perpetual rent
charges (nominal)
Rent/price ratio
on land (real)
Annual inflation
rate
1151-1200 9.5
1201-1250 10.3 7.3 +0.5
1251-1300 10.2 10.3 +0.5
1301-1350 11.2 10.2 +0.3
1351-1400 4.5 9.4 0.0
1401-1450 -- 5.6 0.0
1451-1500 4.0 5.0 +0.2
1501-1550 4.6 5.5 +1.2
1551-1600 6.0 5.8 +1.8
1601-1650 6.0 5.4 +0.7
1651-1700 5.3 5.4 -0.2
1701-1750 4.3 4.3 -0.3
1751-1800 4.0 3.6 +1.4
1801-1850 3.6 -0.8
Source: Clark (1988: 273)
TABLE 5: Interest rates in other European countries (% per annum)
Flanders
(land)
France
(rent
charges)
Italy
(land)
Italy
(rent
charges,
wheat)
Italy
(rent
charges,
money)
Germany
(rent
charges)
1201-1250 10.8 8.6 9.5
1251-1300 10.0 11.1 10.6 10.9 10.8
1301-1350 12.9 14.0 7.3 10.1
1351-1400 8.1 10.3 6.0 9.7
1401-1450 9.6 10.4 8.4 8.5
1451-1500 6.4 9.2 7.6 11.6 6.5
1501-1550 8.2 5.3
1551-1600 4.3 8.3
1601-1650 3.9 6.6
1651-1700 4.4
1701-1750 3.8 4.2
1751-1800 2.7 4.8 4.7
Source: Clark (1988: 274)
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TABLE 6: Comparative GB/India costs and prices (India =100)
A. Costs
Wage
(W/W*)
Raw cotton
price
(C/C*)
Cost of
capital
(R/R*)
TFI price
c.1680 400 182 137 206
c.1770 460 320 113 270
c.1790 663 480 106 357
c.1820 517 127 61 150
B. Prices and TFP
TFI price FOB
price
(P/P*)
TFP
(A/A*)
c.1680 206 200 103
c.1770 270 200 135
c.1790 357 147 243
c.1820 150 53 283
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2008).
FIGURE 2: Patents issued in England, 1661-1851
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Source: Derived from Sullivan (1989).
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TABLE 7: Daily real consumption wages of European unskilled building labourers (London 1500-49 = 100)
1300-
49
1350-
99
1400-
49
1450-
99
1500-
49
1550-
99
1600-
49
1650-
99
1700-
49
1750-
99
1800-
49
Northwestern Europe
London 57 75 107 113 100 85 80 96 110 99 98
Amsterdam 97 74 92 98 107 98 79
Antwerp 101 109 98 88 93 88 92 88 82
Paris 62 60 59 60 56 51 65
Southern Europe
Valencia 108 103 79 63 62 53 51 41 --
Madrid -- 56 51 -- 58 42 --
Florence/Milan 44 87 107 77 62 53 57 51 47 35 26
Naples 73 54 69 -- 88 50 33
Central & eastern
Europe
Gdansk 78 50 69 72 73 61 40
Warsaw -- 75 66 72 45 64 82
Krakow 92 73 67 74 65 67 58 63 40
Vienna 115 101 88 60 61 63 61 50 27
Leipzig -- 34 35 57 53 44 53
Augsburg 62 50 39 63 55 50 --
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 7); derived from the database underlying Allen (2001: 429).
TABLE 8: Levels of annual GDP per capita in Western Europe (Great Britain in
1820=100)
1300 1400 1500 1570 1650 1700 1750 1820
Great Britain 29 38 43 44 54 69 84 100
Netherlands 58 58 95 94 94 92
Belgium 46 55 53 55 61 62
Italy 71 71 67 65 60 57 61 53
Spain 46 46 44 42 41 48
Sweden 51 56
Poland 49 45 46 38 32 41
Weighted average 54 54 55 56 56 58
Source: Derived from van Zanden (2006).
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